American Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Innovation and Research (AJAMIR)

E-ISSN: XXXX-XXXX ● Website: www.ajamir.com ● Email: editor@ajamir.com

Values-Based Negotiation in Interorganizational Partnerships

Dr. Paul B. Dobson

Professor, University of East Anglia, United Kingdom

Abstract

Interorganizational partnerships require organizations with separate identities, objectives, governance structures, and stakeholder obligations to establish agreements that remain workable beyond the initial negotiation. Conventional bargaining can successfully allocate price, resources, responsibilities, intellectual property, risk, and control while leaving more fundamental differences concerning fairness, transparency, social responsibility, quality, reciprocity, autonomy, and acceptable conduct unresolved. This study develops values-based negotiation as an interorganizational capability through which prospective or existing partners identify shared principles, clarify legitimate value differences, establish procedural commitments, and translate these understandings into workable commercial and governance arrangements. The framework integrates integrative-negotiation theory, interorganizational trust, relational governance, strategic-alliance research, procedural fairness, and the relational view of competitive advantage. Because no primary partnership dataset was supplied, a transparent simulation-based explanatory design was adopted.

A synthetic dataset of 320 hypothetical interorganizational negotiations was constructed using values-based negotiation maturity, shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, interorganizational trust, and negotiated partnership quality as seven-point constructs. The simulated results produced a strong positive association between values-based negotiation maturity and negotiated partnership quality (r = 0.736). Procedural fairness (r = 0.665), interorganizational trust (r = 0.644), and shared-value clarity (r = 0.612) were also positively associated with partnership quality. A multiple-regression model incorporating the four predictors explained approximately 67.8% of the simulated variance in negotiated partnership quality. Mean partnership quality increased from 3.53 among very-low-maturity negotiations to 5.82 among very-high-maturity negotiations. These numerical results are synthetic and do not represent observed partnerships. The paper argues that values-based negotiation should not require complete similarity between organizations. Its strategic value lies in identifying where values genuinely converge, where differences require explicit safeguards, and how commercial agreements can be structured so that cooperation does not depend entirely on either goodwill or contractual control.

Keywords: values-based negotiation, interorganizational partnerships, strategic alliances, interorganizational trust, relational governance, procedural fairness, integrative negotiation

1. Introduction

Interorganizational partnerships enable organizations to combine capabilities, knowledge, technologies, market access, distribution networks, legitimacy, and complementary resources that would be difficult or inefficient to develop independently. Strategic-alliance research consequently treats alliances as voluntary cooperative arrangements through which independent organizations exchange, share, or jointly develop products, technologies, services, or other strategically significant resources. Yet collaboration simultaneously creates interdependence and vulnerability. Partners retain separate interests while becoming dependent on one another for important outcomes, producing continuing concerns involving opportunism, uncertainty, coordination, information disclosure, and control. Parkhe's analysis of alliance structuring and subsequent research on alliance governance demonstrate why cooperation cannot be assumed merely because an agreement has been signed.

Negotiation is therefore not confined to the formation stage of a partnership. Organizations negotiate initial responsibilities, resource contributions, ownership arrangements, performance standards, intellectual property, decision rights, risk allocation, escalation procedures, adaptation rules, and termination conditions. They also renegotiate these arrangements when technologies, markets, regulations, organizational leadership, or strategic priorities change. Research on strategic alliances explicitly describes collaboration as involving continuing negotiation and adjustment between organizational partners rather than a single completed transaction. Interorganizational negotiation should accordingly be evaluated not only according to whether the parties reach agreement, but also according to whether the agreement provides a credible foundation for subsequent cooperation.

Traditional distributive bargaining can be appropriate where interests are directly opposed and a fixed resource must be allocated. Partnership negotiations, however, usually contain both distributive and integrative dimensions. Negotiation research shows that trust, information exchange, questioning, and the discovery of underlying interests can influence the ability of parties to identify mutually beneficial trade-offs and create joint value. Long-term partnerships also require parties to consider consequences that occur after formal bargaining ends. A negotiator who maximizes immediate advantage by exploiting informational or bargaining power may secure favorable contractual terms while simultaneously weakening the relational conditions necessary for future knowledge sharing, flexibility, and joint problem solving.

Values complicate this problem because organizations do not enter partnerships as economically neutral entities. They possess principles and priorities concerning issues such as quality, customer treatment, sustainability, confidentiality, employee welfare, innovation, transparency, integrity, social responsibility, risk, and acceptable competitive conduct. Interorganizational research indicates that relational norms and shared expectations influence cooperation, while studies of governance emphasize that contractual and relational mechanisms can operate together rather than as simple substitutes. Trust research likewise distinguishes confidence in a partner's competence from confidence in its integrity, highlighting that technical capability and perceived honesty or character can produce different consequences within interorganizational relationships.

The present study introduces values-based negotiation as a systematic approach for bringing these normative dimensions into interorganizational bargaining without replacing commercial rigor. Values-based negotiation is defined here as the process through which organizations identify consequential shared values and value differences, translate them into explicit negotiation principles and decision criteria, evaluate trade-offs against both economic and relational consequences, and design agreements that protect legitimate organizational interests while sustaining a workable basis for cooperation. The framework does not assume that partners should possess identical values or that moral language should override contractual precision. Instead, it proposes that partnership quality improves when organizations know where they agree, where they differ, which principles are non-negotiable, and how those differences will be governed. Because no actual partnership dataset was supplied, the study uses a simulation-based design to demonstrate how these propositions could be evaluated empirically.

2. Objectives of the Study

2.1 To Conceptualize Values-Based Negotiation as an Interorganizational Capability

The first objective is to distinguish values-based negotiation from generalized cooperative bargaining. Integrative negotiation seeks opportunities for joint gains by identifying different priorities and interests across issues. Values-based negotiation incorporates this logic but extends it by asking whether an apparently attractive commercial trade-off is consistent with the principles each organization is prepared to defend throughout the relationship. A partnership can therefore be economically complementary while remaining difficult to govern if the parties hold incompatible expectations regarding transparency, acceptable risk, customer treatment, intellectual-property use, quality standards, or responsibility for adverse consequences.

Values-based negotiation is consequently treated as a repeatable organizational capability rather than as the personal ethical orientation of an individual negotiator. It requires preparation mechanisms through which organizational values are translated into negotiation criteria, internal alignment concerning non-negotiable boundaries, procedures for identifying a partner's underlying priorities, and governance mechanisms that connect negotiated principles with subsequent behavior. The capability becomes especially relevant when the partnership involves repeated transactions, uncertain future conditions, shared reputation, or joint activities that cannot be completely specified in advance.

2.2 To Examine the Relationship Between Values-Based Negotiation and Partnership Quality

The second objective is to examine whether stronger values-based negotiation maturity is theoretically associated with higher negotiated partnership quality. Partnership quality is defined as the extent to which an agreement produces economic workability, clarity of expectations, perceived legitimacy, balanced protection of partner interests, adaptability, and a credible basis for continuing cooperation.

This definition deliberately avoids treating agreement itself as evidence of negotiation success. Organizations can reach agreements because one party possesses greater bargaining power, because time pressure discourages deeper discussion, or because important value conflicts remain undiscovered. The proposed framework therefore evaluates negotiation according to both immediate agreement quality and its capacity to support future interorganizational coordination.

2.3 To Assess Shared-Value Clarity, Procedural Fairness, and Trust

The third objective is to assess three mechanisms expected to accompany values-based negotiation: shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, and interorganizational trust. Shared-value clarity refers not to complete value similarity but to explicit knowledge concerning areas of genuine alignment and material divergence. This distinction prevents superficial declarations of "shared values" from replacing substantive examination of organizational priorities.

Procedural fairness concerns whether negotiation rules, information exchange, opportunity for voice, decision criteria, and treatment of the parties are perceived as legitimate. Interorganizational trust concerns confidence that the counterpart possesses both sufficient capability and an acceptable degree of integrity to perform its commitments. Existing interorganizational research demonstrates the importance of trust in alliance relationships and shows that relational governance mechanisms can complement formal contractual structures.

3. Review of Literature

3.1 Integrative Negotiation and the Creation of Joint Value

Negotiation research distinguishes situations dominated by distributive allocation from those containing possibilities for integrative agreement. Thompson, Wang, and Gunia's review of negotiation research emphasizes the importance of information exchange, trust, cognition, social motives, and interpersonal processes in shaping negotiated outcomes. Distrust can make negotiators reluctant to exchange information or ask questions because they anticipate exploitation, thereby reducing opportunities for integrative value creation. This insight is particularly relevant to partnerships because the parties commonly possess complementary interests that cannot be discovered if they negotiate only through fixed positions.

The distinction between positions and underlying interests is therefore central to partnership negotiation. Organizations may appear to disagree strongly over a particular contractual term while the underlying concern involves a different issue such as reputation, predictability, operational autonomy, intellectual-property protection, or risk exposure. Effective negotiation can create value by identifying these underlying concerns and constructing trade-offs across issues. However, value creation does not eliminate value claiming. Organizations remain accountable to their own stakeholders and must protect legitimate interests. Values-based negotiation should therefore be viewed as a disciplined approach to the tension between cooperative problem solving and organizational self-protection rather than as a requirement for unconditional compromise.

Long-term partnerships make this tension more complex because current negotiation behavior can influence subsequent interactions. Ness' examination of alliance dynamics explicitly links governance mechanisms and negotiation strategies with evolving relational practices in strategic alliances. Agreements are therefore embedded in a broader sequence of interactions. The negotiation process can communicate whether a partner is likely to act opportunistically, whether difficult issues can be discussed openly, and whether the parties possess compatible approaches to problem solving. Values-based negotiation extends integrative logic by treating these process signals as part of the value created or destroyed during bargaining.

3.2 Interorganizational Trust and Relational Governance

Trust has become a central construct in interorganizational research because cooperative relationships expose independent organizations to risks that cannot always be eliminated through formal control.

Zaheer and Harris' synthesis of interorganizational trust describes trust as consequential for organizations engaged in dyadic and network relationships such as strategic alliances. Earlier alliance research by Nooteboom and colleagues demonstrated that trust and governance influence perceived relational risk, while later research has continued to examine how trust interacts with contractual mechanisms.

The distinction between competence-based and integrity-based trust is especially useful for values-based negotiation. Connelly and colleagues emphasize that organizations can trust partners for different reasons: one partner may be technically capable and reliable while another dimension concerns honesty, motives, and character. A partnership negotiation that examines only technical capability, price, and delivery commitments may therefore ignore integrity-based concerns that become important when unforeseen circumstances require discretionary behavior. Values-based negotiation creates an opportunity to discuss the standards the parties expect to guide such discretion.

Relational governance does not imply that formal contracts are unnecessary. Alliance-governance research increasingly rejects a simple choice between trust and contractual control. Poppo and Zenger's influential work proposed that formal contracts and relational governance may function as complements, while subsequent research by Cao and Lumineau showed that the interplay between contractual and relational mechanisms depends on specific conditions. Values-based negotiation is compatible with this complementary view. Values establish behavioral principles and expectations; contracts specify rights, responsibilities, safeguards, and procedures. Neither mechanism should be expected to substitute completely for the other.

3.3 Shared Values, Procedural Integrity, and Partnership Governance

Shared values can contribute to interorganizational cooperation when they produce compatible expectations regarding appropriate behavior. Reviews of interorganizational relationships identify relational norms, goal congruence, frame alignment, shared priorities, and communication as factors capable of shaping trust and limiting opportunism. However, the concept of shared values should be applied carefully. Organizations rarely possess complete similarity in priorities, and demanding excessive similarity may eliminate valuable complementarity. Partnerships often exist precisely because the organizations differ in capabilities, perspectives, resources, or institutional positions.

The more useful objective is therefore value clarity rather than value uniformity. Parties need to know which values are jointly important, which priorities differ but can coexist, and which differences create unacceptable risk. For example, two organizations may share a commitment to product safety while differing in their preferred pace of innovation. That difference does not necessarily prevent partnership if they can agree on safety thresholds, experimentation procedures, and decision rights. By contrast, a fundamental conflict concerning data privacy or lawful conduct may require explicit contractual safeguards or make partnership inadvisable.

Procedural integrity becomes particularly important where substantive values differ. Fair procedures provide a mechanism through which partners can negotiate disagreement without requiring identical preferences. Interorganizational governance research shows that contractual and relational mechanisms jointly shape cooperation and that balanced reciprocal arrangements may help relationships withstand conflict and uncertainty. Values-based negotiation therefore treats procedural fairness as more than politeness. It is an institutional condition that helps organizations manage legitimate differences while preserving the possibility of continuing cooperation.

4. Research Methodology

4.1 Research Design and Simulation Rationale

The study employed a quantitative simulation-based explanatory design. No completed negotiation records, alliance contracts, partner surveys, or independently evaluated partnership outcomes were supplied. Consequently, the numerical analysis does not claim to describe real interorganizational negotiations. Simulation was used solely to demonstrate the statistical implications of the proposed conceptual model and to provide a reproducible foundation for later empirical testing.

The synthetic dataset contained 320 hypothetical interorganizational negotiation profiles. Each observation represented a prospective or ongoing partnership negotiation rather than an identifiable firm, public agency, nonprofit organization, or negotiator. Five constructs were represented through seven-point scales: values-based negotiation maturity, shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, interorganizational trust, and negotiated partnership quality.

Table 1: Operationalization of the Simulation Framework

Construct	Scale	Conceptual Operationalization	Analytical Role
Values-Based Negotiation Maturity	1–7	Degree to which partners identify values, clarify interests and non-negotiable boundaries, apply principled criteria, and connect negotiated values with governance	Primary explanatory variable
Shared-Value Clarity	1–7	Explicit understanding of genuine value alignment, legitimate differences, and areas requiring safeguards	Explanatory mechanism
Procedural Fairness	1–7	Perceived fairness of voice, information exchange, decision criteria, treatment, and negotiation procedures	Explanatory mechanism
Interorganizational Trust	1–7	Confidence in the counterpart's capability, reliability, integrity, and willingness to honor the cooperative relationship	Explanatory mechanism
Negotiated Partnership Quality	1–7	Perceived quality of agreement in terms of joint value, legitimacy, clarity, adaptability, and sustainability	Dependent variable

Note: All observations are synthetic and were generated exclusively for methodological demonstration.

4.2 Synthetic Data Construction and Analytical Logic

Values-based negotiation maturity was generated as the principal explanatory construct. Shared-value clarity was modeled as positively related to negotiation maturity because more mature negotiation processes explicitly surface organizational priorities and areas of divergence. Procedural fairness was also modeled as positively but imperfectly related because values-based negotiation should encourage legitimate process while recognizing that bargaining power and institutional conditions may independently affect fairness.

Interorganizational trust was modeled as a function of values-based negotiation maturity, shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, and random variation. This structure reflects the proposition that trust can be strengthened when organizations understand one another's values and experience a fair negotiation process, but trust also depends on history, competence, reputation, prior performance, and contextual conditions that are not captured by negotiation design alone.

Negotiated partnership quality was generated from values-based negotiation maturity, shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, interorganizational trust, and stochastic error. Random variation was intentionally retained because actual partnership outcomes would also depend on resource complementarity, competitive conditions, contract design, bargaining power, leadership changes, technological uncertainty, legal institutions, and subsequent implementation behavior.

4.3 Statistical Procedures and Evaluation Criteria

The analytical procedure included descriptive statistics, Pearson correlations, maturity-group comparison, and ordinary least squares multiple regression. Negotiated partnership quality was specified as the dependent variable. Values-based negotiation maturity, shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, and interorganizational trust were entered simultaneously as explanatory variables.

For comparative analysis, the 320 synthetic negotiation profiles were divided into five equal maturity categories containing 64 observations each: very low, low, moderate, high, and very high. Means were calculated for each construct within these categories. Statistical relationships reflect the behavior of the synthetic dataset and must not be interpreted as inferential evidence concerning a population of actual interorganizational partnerships.

5. Analysis

5.1 Relationships Among Values-Based Negotiation Constructs

The synthetic dataset produced an average values-based negotiation maturity score of 4.13, shared-value clarity of 3.91, procedural fairness of 3.77, interorganizational trust of 4.20, and negotiated partnership quality of 4.68.

Values-based negotiation maturity demonstrated the strongest bivariate relationship with negotiated partnership quality, producing a Pearson correlation of $r = 0.736$. Procedural fairness was positively associated with partnership quality at $r = 0.665$, while interorganizational trust produced $r = 0.644$ and shared-value clarity produced $r = 0.612$.

American Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Innovation and Research (AJAMIR)
E-ISSN: XXXX-XXXX ● Website: www.ajamir.com ● Email: editor@ajamir.com

The pattern is consistent with the proposed theoretical model because it suggests that values-based negotiation cannot be reduced to shared-value similarity alone. Partnership quality also depends substantially on whether negotiations are conducted through legitimate procedures and whether the parties regard one another as sufficiently trustworthy for continuing collaboration.

5.2 Partnership Outcomes Across Negotiation-Maturity Levels

The maturity-group comparison shows a progressive improvement in negotiated partnership quality as values-based negotiation maturity increases.

Table 2: Simulated Outcomes Across Values-Based Negotiation Maturity

Negotiation Maturity	Synthetic Partnerships (n)	Mean Values-Based Negotiation	Mean Shared-Value Clarity	Mean Procedural Fairness	Mean Interorganizational Trust	Mean Partnership Quality
Very Low	64	2.54	2.87	2.88	3.16	3.53
Low	64	3.54	3.46	3.46	3.82	4.24
Moderate	64	4.17	3.94	3.75	4.19	4.73
High	64	4.78	4.33	4.21	4.62	5.06
Very High	64	5.62	4.93	4.56	5.22	5.82

Mean negotiated partnership quality increased from 3.53 in the very-low-maturity category to 5.82 in the very-high category, producing an illustrative difference of 2.29 points on the seven-point scale. Shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, and interorganizational trust also increased progressively.

The results support the internal logic that values-based negotiation may become increasingly consequential as it develops from symbolic discussion of organizational values into a systematic process of identifying boundaries, evaluating trade-offs, and embedding agreed principles into governance arrangements. Again, the numerical progression represents the assumptions of the simulation rather than observed empirical evidence.

American Journal of Advanced Multidisciplinary Innovation and Research (AJAMIR)

E-ISSN: XXXX-XXXX ● Website: www.ajamir.com ● Email: editor@ajamir.com

Graph 1: Simulated Partnership Quality Across Values-Based Negotiation Maturity



The box plots show the distribution of negotiated partnership quality within each maturity category, and the mean is marked within each group.

Interpretation: The distribution of partnership-quality scores shifts upward as values-based negotiation maturity increases. Variation remains present within every category, illustrating that negotiation design alone does not determine partnership outcomes.

Key Finding: The synthetic analysis indicates a substantial positive relationship between mature values-based negotiation practices and the quality of negotiated interorganizational partnerships.

5.3 Multivariate Assessment of Negotiated Partnership Quality

Multiple regression was conducted to determine whether values-based negotiation maturity remained associated with partnership quality after shared-value clarity, procedural fairness, and interorganizational trust were represented simultaneously. The model produced an R^2 of 0.678 and an adjusted R^2 of 0.674, indicating that the four constructs jointly accounted for approximately 67.8% of the simulated variation in negotiated partnership quality.

The relative coefficients provide an important conceptual implication. Shared values alone are insufficient. A partnership can display substantial value similarity and still experience weak outcomes when negotiation procedures appear unfair or when the organizations do not trust one another's implementation behavior. Values-based negotiation should consequently be understood as an integrated governance capability linking normative alignment with procedural and relational mechanisms.

6. Discussion

6.1 Values-Based Negotiation Should Clarify Differences Rather Than Manufacture Agreement

A principal contribution of the framework is the distinction between value alignment and value clarity. Partnership discourse frequently emphasizes shared values because similarity appears conducive to trust and cooperation. Interorganizational research indeed shows that shared priorities, communication, relational norms, and goal congruence can support cooperation and reduce opportunistic tendencies. Yet organizations should not interpret this evidence as requiring artificial declarations of similarity.

Commercial partners often possess legitimately different priorities. A technology developer may value experimentation and speed, while a regulated service provider prioritizes reliability and compliance. A supplier may emphasize production efficiency while a customer emphasizes customization. A nonprofit organization may prioritize mission reach while a commercial partner requires financial sustainability. These differences can become sources of complementarity rather than conflict when they are explicitly acknowledged and translated into governance arrangements.

Values-based negotiation should therefore include a values boundary analysis. The parties can distinguish shared principles, negotiable preferences, tolerable differences, and non-negotiable limits. This process prevents broad terms such as integrity, innovation, sustainability, or fairness from creating an illusion of alignment when the partners interpret them differently. Mature negotiation does not require the parties to erase differences; it requires them to understand whether those differences can be governed without undermining the partnership.

6.2 Procedural Fairness Converts Value Commitments Into Negotiation Legitimacy

The simulated results position procedural fairness as an important contributor to partnership quality. This is theoretically significant because interorganizational partners often possess unequal bargaining power. Larger buyers, platform owners, governments, technology providers, or resource-controlling organizations may have the ability to impose terms that weaker counterparts accept because attractive alternatives are limited. Such agreements may be contractually enforceable while remaining relationally fragile.

Values-based negotiation does not eliminate bargaining power, but it requires organizations to decide how that power will be exercised. Fair process can involve transparent decision criteria, reasonable access to relevant information, genuine opportunity to explain material concerns, clear escalation procedures, and explicit explanation when a partner's proposal cannot be accepted. These procedural safeguards can preserve legitimacy even when substantive outcomes are unequal because the parties contribute different resources or bear different risks.

This logic is compatible with research showing that formal and relational governance can complement each other. Procedural values can be translated directly into contract and governance design through joint steering committees, dispute-escalation processes, review intervals, audit rights, information-sharing protocols, and procedures for responding to unforeseen circumstances. The resulting agreement is neither purely relational nor purely contractual. Its durability comes from connecting relational expectations with institutional mechanisms capable of sustaining them when personnel or conditions change.

6.3 Trustworthy Partnerships Require Both Integrity and Safeguards

The third implication concerns trust. Trust can support cooperation by reducing fear that information, dependence, or flexibility will be exploited. Interorganizational trust research has consistently treated trust as consequential for alliance behavior and performance, while Connelly and colleagues demonstrate the importance of distinguishing competence-based from integrity-based trust. Values-based negotiation is especially connected with integrity-based judgments because negotiation behavior reveals how a prospective partner treats commitments, uncertainty, disagreement, and the legitimate interests of others.

However, strong values language should never become a substitute for appropriate due diligence or contractual protection. Interorganizational relationships can produce a “dark side,” including excessive dependence, opportunism, conflict, lock-in, unethical practices, and other dysfunctional consequences. Reviews of interorganizational relationships explicitly caution that collaboration can produce costs as well as benefits. Mature partnership design therefore requires what may be described as trust with safeguards.

This approach also protects relationships when individuals change. Partnerships based entirely on personal trust between two executives can become unstable after leadership turnover. Values-based negotiation is stronger when agreed principles are embedded within organizational routines, contractual provisions, escalation structures, performance measures, and recurring governance conversations. The objective is not to replace interpersonal trust but to institutionalize enough of the relationship's logic that cooperation does not depend exclusively on the continued presence of its original negotiators.

7. Conclusion

Values-based negotiation provides a framework for understanding interorganizational bargaining as a process that simultaneously allocates economic value and establishes the normative foundations of cooperation. Partnerships expose independent organizations to one another's decisions, information, reputation, resources, and discretionary behavior. The quality of negotiation therefore cannot be evaluated exclusively through price, concessions, or the successful signing of an agreement. A sustainable negotiated arrangement must also establish how partners will behave when contracts are incomplete, priorities conflict, or unexpected circumstances require judgment.

The simulation-based analysis produced relationships consistent with this conceptual position. Values-based negotiation maturity showed a strong positive simulated association with negotiated partnership quality, while procedural fairness, interorganizational trust, and shared-value clarity were also positively related to the outcome. Partnership-quality scores increased substantially from the very-low to the very-high maturity categories. These results are analytical demonstrations created from synthetic data and should not be represented as observations from actual strategic alliances or interorganizational negotiations.

The study's theoretical contribution lies in integrating integrative negotiation with interorganizational trust, relational governance, strategic-alliance research, and value alignment. The framework argues that the most important contribution of values is not the discovery that partner organizations are identical. Interorganizational partnerships often derive strategic value precisely from difference. The relevant capability is the ability to determine which differences create productive complementarity, which require negotiated safeguards, and which represent incompatibilities that should not be concealed for the sake of reaching agreement. Values-based negotiation is therefore simultaneously cooperative and discriminating.

Future empirical research should test the framework using actual alliance negotiations, supplier partnerships, public–private collaborations, nonprofit–business partnerships, technology alliances, and cross-sector initiatives. Longitudinal designs could examine whether values-based negotiation at the formation stage predicts subsequent conflict frequency, renegotiation quality, trust development, information sharing, adaptation, and partnership survival. Research should also investigate asymmetrical bargaining power, national and organizational culture, institutional logics, prior partnership experience, and the interaction between values-based negotiation and contract complexity. A particularly important question is whether explicit value disagreement can sometimes strengthen partnerships by making difficult issues governable before they become crises. The most credible partnership is therefore not necessarily the one in which organizations claim to share every value, but the one in which both sides understand what matters, recognize where they differ, and possess legitimate mechanisms for negotiating those differences over time.

References

1. Fisher, R., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in. Penguin Books.
2. Lax, D. A., & Sebenius, J. K. (2006). 3-D negotiation: Powerful tools to change the game in your most important deals. Harvard Business School Press.
3. Thompson, L. L. (2001). The mind and heart of the negotiator (2nd ed.). Prentice Hall.
4. Lewicki, R. J., Barry, B., & Saunders, D. M. (2011). Negotiation (6th ed.). McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
5. Brett, J. M. (2007). Negotiating globally: How to negotiate deals, resolve disputes, and make decisions across cultural boundaries (2nd ed.). Jossey-Bass.
6. Pruitt, D. G., & Carnevale, P. J. (1993). Negotiation in social conflict. Open University Press.
7. Gulati, R. (1995). Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 85–112. https://doi.org/10.5465/256729
8. Ring, P. S., & Van de Ven, A. H. (1994). Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. Academy of Management Review, 19(1), 90–118. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1994.9410122009
9. Das, T. K., & Teng, B. S. (2000). A resource-based theory of strategic alliances. Journal of Management, 26(1), 31–61. https://doi.org/10.1177/014920630002600105
10. Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660–679. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1998.1255632
11. Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V. (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science, 9(2), 141–159. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.9.2.141

12. Jap, S. D., & Ganesan, S. (2000). Control mechanisms and the relationship life cycle: Implications for safeguarding specific investments and developing commitment. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 227–245. https://doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.37.2.227.18735
13. Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, S. D. (1994). The commitment-trust theory of relationship marketing. Journal of Marketing, 58(3), 20–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/002224299405800302
14. Vangen, S., & Huxham, C. (2003). Nurturing collaborative relations: Building trust in interorganizational collaboration. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 39(1), 5–31. https://doi.org/10.1177/0021886303039001001
15. Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of network governance: Structure, management, and effectiveness. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(2), 229–252. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mum015
16. Gray, B., & Wood, D. J. (1991). Collaborative alliances: Moving from practice to theory. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 27(1), 3–22.
17. Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. (2000). Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 217–237. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1097-0266(200003)21:3%3C217::AID-SMJ95%3E3.0.CO;2-Y
18. Zaheer, S., Albert, S., & Zaheer, A. (1999). Time scales and organizational theory. Academy of Management Review, 24(4), 725–741. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1999.2553255
19. Cropper, S., Ebers, M., Huxham, C., & Smith Ring, P. (Eds.). (2008). The Oxford handbook of inter-organizational relations. Oxford University Press.
20. Parmigiani, A., & Rivera-Santos, M. (2011). Clearing a path through the forest: A meta-review of interorganizational relationships. Journal of Management, 37(4), 1108–1136. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311407507